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INTRODUCTION
Ruthelle Frank was born in her home in Brokaw, Wisconsin, in
1927. Her mother made a record of her birth in the family Bible, but
the state did not issue her a birth certificate.2 A lifelong resident of
Wisconsin, she currently serves her community as an elected member
of the Brokaw Village Board.3 She has exercised her right to vote in
every election since 1948.4
1

* J.D. candidate, May 2016, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois
Institute of Technology; B.S.C., Business Management, DePaul University, 2008. I
would like to thank Professor Mark Rosen and Professor Atiba Ellis for their
guidance. I would also like to thank my mother and grandmother for their patience
and support.
1
Jon Sherman, Out in the Cold at Age 84: Wisconsin’s Ruthelle Frank Fights
for Her Right to Vote, Voter Disfranchisement, ACLU (Dec. 13, 2011, 11:39am),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/voting-rights/out-cold-age-84-wisconsins-ruthelle-frankfights-her-right-vote.
2
Id.
3
ACLU Files Lawsuit Challenging Wisconsin’s Unconstitutional Voter ID
Law, Voting Rights, ACLU (Dec. 13, 2011), https://www.aclu.org/voting-rights/aclufiles-lawsuit-challenging-wisconsins-unconstitutional-voter-id-law.
4
Id.
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Unfortunately, Ruthelle will be unable to cast a ballot in the
next election because of Wisconsin’s new voter identification (“ID”)
law. The law requires that Wisconsin residents present one of several
qualifying forms of photo ID before voting.5 Ruthelle has a
certification of baptism, a Medicare statement, and a checkbook; but
she has been unable to obtain one of the acceptable forms of ID.6 In
order to acquire a qualifying form of ID under the Wisconsin law,
Ruthelle needs a birth certificate.7 However, the state refuses to issue
her one because her name on file with the state Register of Deeds
contains a spelling error; and she cannot petition the court to amend
the document without paying as much as $200 in fees.8 If she
successfully fixes the error, she must then pay $20 for a copy of the
birth certificate.9 Next, she would need to take it, along with 2 other
forms of proof, to a local government office to obtain the ID required
by the state.10 For Ruthelle, a woman in her late 80s on a fixed
income, these hurdles are not trivial.
Although Ruthelle Frank’s situation may appear unique, an
estimated 300,000 of Wisconsin’s residents must now take some
affirmative action to satisfy these new requirements to vote.11 In
December of 2011, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed
suit on behalf of Ms. Frank and all other similarly situated voters,
seeking to prevent implementation of Wisconsin’s voter ID law, also
known as Act 23.12 The ACLU claimed Act 23 imposed an undue
5

See id.
Tanya Somanader, Wisconsin Voter ID Law May Force 84-Year-Old Woman
To Pay $200 To Get A Voter ID, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Dec. 5, 2011, 4:30pm),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2011/12/05/381885/wisconsin-voter-id-law-mayforce-84-year-old-woman-to-pay-200-to-get-a-voter-id/.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Sherman, supra note 1.
11
Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854 (E.D. Wis. 2014), rev'd, 768 F.3d
744 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015).
6

12

ACLU Files Lawsuit Challenging Wisconsin’s Unconstitutional
Voter ID Law, supra note 3.
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burden on voters in violation of constitutional protections under the
Fourteenth Amendment.13
Supporters of Wisconsin’s “strict”14 voter ID law claimed that
it was necessary to detect and prevent voter fraud, maintain confidence
in election integrity, and improve election administration.15 But critics
of the law argued that voter fraud is virtually non-existent in
Wisconsin and voter confidence is unrelated to the strictness of a
state’s voting laws.16 They also argued that the law suppresses voter
turnout in large numbers. Because for many, the perceived difference
of one vote is outweighed by the time, effort, and cost required to
satisfy the new requirement. They also contend the law makes voting
impossible for many and that low-income and minority subgroups are
disproportionately affected by the regulations.17 These subgroups of
voters are generally more likely to vote democratic. Thus support and
opposition for Act 23 among legislators was sharply divided along
partisan lines.18
Mrs. Frank’s claim in Frank v. Walker came fresh on the heels
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board, where the high court considered strict voter ID
requirements for the first time.19 In Crawford, the Court considered a
13

Id.
“Strict” voter ID laws require further action from voters without acceptable
ID before their ballots will count. For example, Act 23 provides that voters without
ID may vote on a provisional ballot but must provide a qualified photo ID to the
election inspectors before polls close or to the municipal clerk by 4:00pm on the
following Friday. Wendy Underhill, Voter Identification Requirements, Voter Id
Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 24, 2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx.
15
Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 847.
16
Id. at 847-48, 851.
17
Id. at 862, 870.
18
Wisconsin Assembly, Assembly Bill 7, 2011-2012 Wisconsin Legislature,
Wisconsin State Legislature (May 11, 2011, 11:10pm),
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/data/votes/av0331.pdf; Wisconsin Senate Roll Call,
Assembly Bill 7, 2011-2012 Wisconsin Legislature, Wisconsin State Legislature
(May 19, 2011, 11:03am), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/data/votes/sv0192.pdf.
19
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
14
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facial challenge20 to Indiana’s SEA 483, a law similar to Wisconsin’s
Act 23.21 There, the Court confirmed that the constitutionality of such
voter ID laws is properly analyzed under the Anderson/Burdick
balancing test, the prevailing method for evaluating election
regulations.22 The Court concluded that state interests advanced by the
requirement were sufficient to defeat the facial attack on the law.23 In
his Crawford opinion, Justice Stevens noted that where an election
regulation is facially neutral24 and supported by some valid
justification, courts should not invalidate it merely because legislative
proponents were partly seeking to entrench themselves in office.25
This comment argues that the current constitutional evaluation
of election regulations is inadequate. A more effective analysis should
contemplate whether improper partisanship contributed to the passage
of a law. Part I traces the development of the two-part test courts
currently employ and its first application by the U.S. Supreme Court to
voter ID laws in Crawford. Part II explores the recent challenge to
Wisconsin’s voter ID law in both the Eastern District of Wisconsin
and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Frank v. Walker. Finally,
Part III analyzes the opinions in Frank and argues that a small change
to the balancing test would yield more equitable results in cases where
political motivations are highly suspect.

20

A “facial challenge” to a law is a challenge that claims the law, as written, is
unconstitutional under all circumstances. In contrast, an “as-applied challenge”
claims that a law is only unconstitutional in its particular application to the plaintiff.
A successful facial challenge will result in complete invalidation of the law, where a
successful as-applied challenge will result merely in modification of the law or the
circumstances in which it may be applied. Richard H. Fallon Jr., Fact and Fiction
about Facial Challenges, 99 Cal. L. Rev. 915, 922-25 (2011). available at:
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol99/iss4/1.
21
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 188.
22
Id. at 190-91.
23
Id. at 202.
24
A “facially neutral” law refers to a one that does not explicitly discriminate
against a particular group.
25
See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204.
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF ELECTION REGULATIONS
The U.S. Constitution contains no explicit guarantee of voting
rights. For much of the country’s early history, federal courts declined
to extend any protections to citizens excluded from elections.26
Instead, the federal judiciary insisted that any voting rights for citizens
originated with the states.27 During this period, states restricted voting
privileges based on gender, religion, race, national origin, property
ownership, length of residency, economic status, and literacy.28
Congress has since enacted four amendments to the
Constitution to protect certain groups from discrimination at the polls.
The Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments
collectively provided that voting rights could not be denied or
abridged based on race, color, previous condition of servitude, sex, or
age (for those having reached majority).29 The Twenty-Fourth
Amendment prohibited the imposition of a poll tax,30 but only in
federal elections.31 These amendments addressed certain forms of
election-related discrimination; however, the Constitution still failed to
affirm voting as a right.
The Supreme Court began to recognize voting as a
fundamental constitutional right during the civil rights era. With a
liberal majority lead by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court deduced
that the right to vote is fundamental because it is “preservative of other
26

See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874) (“Being
unanimously of the opinion that the Constitution of the United States does not confer
the right of suffrage upon any one, and that the constitutions and laws of the several
States which commit that important trust to men alone are not necessarily void.”).
27
See, e.g., id.
28
See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED
HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 53-70 (2000).
29
U.S. CONST. amend. XV; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; U.S. CONST. amend.
XXVI.
30
A “poll tax” is any fee or tax required as a precondition to vote.
31
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
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basic civil and political rights.”32 The Warren Court firmly established
this premise over a string of cases challenging malapportioned districts
in the early 1960s.33 And in 1966, the Court extended this reasoning to
abolish the poll tax in all elections.34 In these cases, the Warren Court
demonstrated that voting rights could be violated through dilution of
the weight of a citizen’s vote and by unjustifiably burdening certain
groups such as the poor.35 However, many commentators argued the
Court failed to establish a clear and consistent method for evaluating
ballot access restrictions in the voting rights cases that followed.36
Nearly two decades later in 1983, the Court first began to outline the
framework for the constitutional analysis used today in Anderson v.
Celebrezze.37
A. The Anderson/Burdick test
In Anderson, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of Ohio’s
early filing requirements for ballot access in presidential elections,
which the state imposed only on independent candidates.38 There, the
Court framed a balancing test.39 Justice Stevens acknowledged that
states must substantially regulate their electoral processes.40 And in
practice, any provision of a state’s complex regulatory scheme will
affect voters’ potential political expression to some degree.41 But,
32

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
34
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
35
Harper, 383 U.S. 663; Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533; Wesberry, 376 U.S. 1.
36
E.g., Terry Smith, Election Laws and First Amendment FreedomsConfusion And Clarification by the Supreme Court, 1988 ANN. SURVEY OF AM. L.
597, 610, 621-22 (1988); Bradley A. Smith, Judicial Protection Of Ballot-Access
Rights: Third Parties Need Not Apply, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 186-87 (1991).
37
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
38
Id. at 780.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 788.
41
Id.
33
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where a regulation’s restrictions are reasonable and nondiscriminatory,
a state’s need to properly facilitate its election procedures will
generally suffice as justification. Therefore, challengers of state
election laws face a presumption in favor of the state.42
In his opinion, Justice Stevens stated that to determine whether
a particular restriction is justified, courts must weigh the character and
magnitude of the asserted impairment to a plaintiff’s constitutional
rights against the interests the state seeks to advance.43 At the same
time, a court should consider the extent to which those burdens are
necessary to achieve those state interests.44 Because of the numerosity
and wide variation in type, effect, and importance of state election
regulations, the Court declined to offer any bright line rules.45 Instead,
it directed lower courts to weigh those factors and reach their own
conclusions.46
The Court found that because the early filing requirement
unequally burdened a certain group with specific and identifiable
political preferences, it was “especially difficult for the state to
justify.”47 It also determined that Ohio had less of a legitimate interest
in a national election than it would in local contests.48 Therefore, the
constitutional interests at stake outweighed any justification put forth
by Ohio.49
Nearly ten years later, the Court created a bifurcated inquiry in
Burdick v. Takushi.50 Justice White noted that under the standard
outlined in Anderson, the proper level of scrutiny depends on the
“extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth

42

Id.
Id.
44
Id. at 789.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 789-90.
47
Id. at 792-93.
48
Id. at 795.
49
Id. at 806.
50
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
43
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Amendment rights.”51 Accordingly, where those rights are severely
restricted, strict scrutiny applies.52 Where restrictions impose less than
severe restrictions, courts should apply the Anderson balance.53 This
two-part test is now commonly referred to as the “Anderson/Burdick
test.”
In Burdick, the Court considered a challenge to Hawaii’s
prohibition on write-in voting.54 The voter bringing the action claimed
that the state’s refusal to count votes for a candidate not officially on
the ballot violated his constitutional rights of expression and
association.55 First, the Court determined that the burden imposed by
this restriction was limited because Hawaii’s system provided ample
opportunity for candidates to participate in the state’s open primary.56
Because there were no identifiable barriers for candidates seeking to
appear on the ballot, “any burden on voters’ freedom of choice and
association is borne only by those who fail to identify their candidate
of choice until days before the primary.”57 The Court previously
determined any interest a candidate and his supporters had in making a
late rather than early decision was of minimal significance.58
Next, the Court considered the interests advanced by the state
of Hawaii.59 The majority cited several benefits the restriction
provided, including avoiding the possibility of unrestrained
factionalism, averting divisive sore-loser candidacies, voter focus
upon contested races in the general election, and guarding against
party raiding.60 The opinion implied that these interests are far more
51

Id.
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 430.
55
Id. at 430-31.
56
Id. at 435-36, 437.
57
Id. at 436-37.
58
Id. at 437.
59
Id. at 439.
60
Id. Party raiding refers to a political tactic where a political party’s members
will vote in another party’s primary to nominate a weaker candidate.
52
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than adequate to defeat the challenge.61 Where an election scheme
imposes only a minimal burden on the right to vote and provides
constitutionally sufficient ballot access, any legitimate state interest
will generally prevail.62
B. What is a “Severe Restriction”?
As described above, a court analyzing the constitutionality of
an election regulation begins with an inquiry into whether the law
imposes a severe restriction on the right to vote.63 In Dunn v.
Blumstein, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that a state election law
that categorically prevents certain citizens from voting must be
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest.64 Indeed,
complete denial of franchise is the most severe possible restriction of
that right. But short of outright denial, what constitutes a severe
restriction?
The Court first used the language of “severe restrictions” in
Norman v. Reed.65 There, the Court considered Illinois’ requirements
for new political parties seeking access to local and statewide office.66
Illinois required that new political parties gather 25,000 qualified voter
signatures in each district their candidates sought office.67 A party
seeking municipal office for one candidate in the city of Chicago and
another candidate for a surrounding suburb had to acquire 25,000
61

See id. at 439-40.
See id. at 439-42.
63
See, e.g., id.
64
See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972) (quoting Kramer v. Union
Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)) (“We concluded that if a
challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies the franchise to
others, ‘the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a
compelling state interest.’”).
65
Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 280 (1992).
66
Id. at 282.
67
Id.
62
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each.68 If that party also wished to run a candidate for county-wide
office, the signature requirement was essentially 50,000 (where it
would otherwise be only 25,000). This is because failure to acquire
enough signatures in any district disqualified the party’s entire slate.69
Although Illinois’ ballot-access scheme was onerous, it was not
insurmountable. Nevertheless, the Court concluded these requirements
severely restricted the right of “like-minded voters to gather in pursuit
of common political ends.”70 Accordingly, it determined that Illinois
did not choose the most narrowly tailored means of advancing their
interest in demonstrating a distribution of support for new parties.71
In subsequent decisions, the Court has repeated its position that
strict scrutiny72 is appropriate for election regulations imposing a
severe burden on constitutional rights.73 In California Democratic
Party v. Jones,74 the Court found a California law placed a severe
burden on the right of political association.75 Proposition 198 changed
the state’s partisan primary election system.76 Before the law took
effect, only members of a particular party could vote for its candidates
in the primary.77 Proposition 198 converted the state’s primary to a
“blanket” system where each voter would be free to select any
candidate, regardless of that candidate’s party affiliation.78 The law
granted voters who refused to expressly affiliate with these parties, or
those that openly affiliated with rivals, legal authority to affect the
68

Id.
Id. at 292-92.
70
Id. at 288, 293-94.
71
Id. at 293-94.
72
To pass strict scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
government interest.
73
E.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992); Clingman v. Beaver,
544 U.S. 581, 592 (2005); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351,
358 (1997).
74
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
75
Id. at 582.
76
Id. at 570.
77
Id.
78
Id.
69
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parties’ candidate selection.79 The Court concluded the law impaired
actual party members’ ability to choose their own candidates.80 Also,
the Court compelled the parties to change their message due to the
adulteration of their candidate selection process.81 The Court found
that although these restrictions did not completely deny franchise, they
severely burdened that right, and therefore strict scrutiny was
appropriate.82
These cases illustrate how the Court is willing to apply strict
scrutiny even where a regulation’s effects threaten less than outright
denial of voting rights. However, the Court’s opinions do not offer any
indication for how lower courts should apply this standard.83 In cases
discussing this type of analysis, the Court reaches its conclusions
subjectively and declines to further specify when a burden becomes
severe. Predictably, lower courts routinely disagree whether a law’s
effects meet this threshold.
C. Crawford v. Marion County Election Board extends the
election regulation test to voter ID laws
While certain states have requested optional, non-photo
identification from voters since the 1950s, only in recent years have
states begun passing laws requiring photo ID at the polls. Indiana and
Georgia were the first states to pass a “strict” photo ID requirement in
2005.84 First implemented in 2008, these strict voter ID laws required
that in-person voters verify their identity with an acceptable
79

80

Id. at 577.

Id. at 578.
Id. at 581.
82
Id. at 582.
83
See generally Joshua A. Douglas, Comment, A Vote for Clarity: Updating
the Supreme Court’s Severe Burden Test for State Election Regulations That
Adversely Impact an Individual’s Right to Vote, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 372, 377-86
(2007).
84
History of Voter ID, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 16,
2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id-history.aspx.
81
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government issued photo ID before their ballot will count.85 In
Crawford, the Supreme Court considered a facial challenge to
Indiana’s law under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,86 marking the first time the U.S. Supreme Court
examined the constitutionality of a state photo ID requirement for
voting.
Indiana’s SEA 483 required that in-person voters show either a
state or federal government issued photo ID.87 Voters who mail in
absentee ballots are not affected by the requirement.88 Those voting in
person without ID may fill out a provisional ballot which will count
only if the voter then makes a separate trip to the county election
office within 10 days following the election.89 There, the voter must
either show an acceptable ID or sign an affidavit claiming indigence or
a religious objection before their ballot will count.90 The law provided
an exception for individuals residing in a state-licensed care facility
such as a nursing home.91
Importantly, the plurality affirmed that voter ID requirements
are properly analyzed under the framework developed in the election
cases outlined above.92 Voter ID requirements which place a severe
limitation on voters’ rights must be narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling state interest.93 Where that burden is less than severe,
courts should balance it against the benefits the law provides for the
state.94 Accordingly, “[h]owever slight that burden may appear . . . , it

85

Id.
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 185 (2008).
87
Id. at 185.
88
Id. at 185-86.
89
Id. at 186.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 190-91.
93
See id.
94
Id.
86
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must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests ‘sufficiently
weighty to justify the limitation.’”95
The plurality began its analysis by addressing the interests
advanced by the state.96 Each interest advanced by the state, in some
part, relates to the state’s primary concern: voter fraud.97 To begin, the
plurality discussed election modernization and referenced two recently
enacted federal statutes that raise certain concerns SEA 483
addresses.98
The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 included a
provision restricting states’ ability to purge names from their voter
rolls.99 The lower court found credible evidence indicating that
Indiana’s 2004 registration lists were inflated by as much as 41.4
percent because they contained the names of persons either deceased
or no longer living in the state.100 Although the plurality
acknowledged that this is partly a product of Indiana’s own
maladministration, it credited the issue as a “neutral and
nondiscriminatory reason supporting the state’s decision to require
photo identification.”101
The Help America Vote Act required that states keep a digital
list of statewide voters and verify new voter registration information
against that list.102 Although this information can be verified by
documents such as a bank statement, paycheck or utility bill, Indiana’s
photo ID requirement effectively establishes a voter’s qualification.103
Next, the plurality discussed Indiana’s interest in deterring and
detecting voter fraud.104 It is well settled that states have a genuine
95

Id. at 191 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992)).
Id.
97
See id.
98
Id. at 192.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 191-92, 196-97.
102
Id. at 192.
103
Id. at 193.
104
Id. at 194.
96
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interest in ensuring the legitimacy of their elections.105 The plurality
claimed that “carefully identifying all voters participating in the
election process” also serves a valid interest in orderly administration
and accurate recordkeeping.106 However, the plurality was careful to
recognize that the record contained no evidence of in-person voter
fraud ever occurring within the state.107
Finally, the plurality mentioned Indiana’s contention that the
law safeguards voter confidence.108 While this concern really
addresses the public perception of voter fraud, the plurality suggested
that “public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process has
independent significance because it encourages citizen participation in
the democratic process.”109 It further noted that the electoral system
cannot inspire this confidence without some protections against fraud
or abuse, such as voter ID laws.110
The plurality then considered the injury to voters’ rights. It
began with a cursory acknowledgement that the ID requirement
presents certain novel issues.111 For example, states commonly charge
a fee for issuing an ID.112 However, Indiana waives this fee. Other
examples include the possibility of physical ID cards getting lost or
stolen or a voter’s ID photo no longer accurately depicting the
individual due to age, hairstyle, facial hair, etc.113 But the plurality
summarily dismissed these issues because voters have the option of
casting a provisional ballot.114 These provisional ballots will
ultimately count so long as voters return to the circuit clerk within ten
days and either show a proper ID or sign an affidavit claiming
105

Id. at 196.
Id.
107
Id. at 194-95.
108
Id. at 197.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 198.
113
Id.
114
Id.
106
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indigence or a religious objection.115 The plurality also found any
inconvenience cost associated with acquiring the ID insignificant.116
For the plurality, the more troubling issue was eligible voters
for whom it is difficult or downright impossible to obtain acceptable
identification.117 For many, these problems originate with locating or
acquiring documents the state requires before issuing ID, such as a
birth certificate.118 The record indicated that some may face financial
issues with the document fees or travel costs.119 Many elderly voters,
especially the indigent, could not locate any record of their birth from
which to obtain a birth certificate.120 For some, this was because they
were born long ago, out of state, and/or outside of a hospital.121
However, the plurality minimized this concern by again citing the
provisional ballot option and affidavit exception.122
Another obstacle voters faced was finding adequate
transportation. Voters without cars must sometimes travel significant
distances to acquire the underlying documents and the photo ID.123
Some voters found this far more difficult than traveling to the local
polling place, especially because Indiana lacks any form of public
transportation in much of the state.124
On the other hand, the record did not contain a credible
estimation of the number of voters without ID.125 It also did not
conclusively demonstrate the burden those voters would endure.126
Those deposed in the record and the named plaintiffs failed to show
115

Id. at 186.
Id. at 198.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 199.
119
Id. at 211 (Souter, J., dissenting).
120
Id. at 199 (majority opinion).
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 213-14 (Souter, J., dissenting).
124
Id.
125
Id. at 200 (majority opinion).
126
Id. at 201.
116
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that the law prevented them from voting.127 They were either
ultimately successful, eligible to submit an absentee ballot without ID,
or presented inadequate testimony otherwise.128 The record did contain
an affidavit from a homeless woman denied ID because she had no
home address, despite having all necessary documentation; however,
the plurality could not determine how common this problem was from
a single occurrence.129
Ultimately, the plurality found the evidence in the record
inadequate and therefore, they found it impossible to “quantify either
the magnitude of the burden on this narrow class of voters or the
portion of the burden imposed on them that is fully justified.”130
Because of this, the plurality declined to weigh the interests of a small
subset of voters against the broad interests advanced by the state.131
Moreover, Justice Stevens remarked on the high burden of persuasion
necessary for the plurality to sustain a facial attack on the entire
statute.132 But, the plurality opinion left open the possibility that a
plaintiff who presents a more developed record, challenges a more
burdensome law, or brings an as-applied constitutional challenge
might carry this burden. In Frank v. Walker, the Seventh Circuit
considered such a constitutional challenge.
II. FRANK V. WALKER
In 2011, the Wisconsin Legislature passed its version of a strict
photo ID voter eligibility law.133 2011 Wisconsin Act 23, signed into
law by Governor Scott Walker, is somewhat similar to the Indiana law
127

Id.
Id.
129
Id. at 201-02.
130
Id. at 200.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 841 (E.D. Wis. 2014), rev'd, 768 F.3d
744 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015).
128

480
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss2/8

16

Pikor: Voter ID in Wisconsin: A Better Approach to Anderson/Burdick Bala

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 10, Issue 2

Spring 2015

upheld in Crawford. For example, individuals must show one of nine
qualifying photo IDs before a poll worker will give them a ballot to
vote.134 Voters without ID may submit a provisional ballot which is
counted after a subsequent trip to the municipal clerk’s office.135 Also,
the law provides an exception for those confined to their home or a
care facility due to age, sickness, injury, or disability.136
However, Act 23 is more restrictive than Indiana’s SEA 483 in
several important ways. First, the Wisconsin law does not allow those
voting through provisional ballots the option to sign an affidavit
claiming indigence or a religious objection.137 When subsequently
appearing at the municipal clerk’s office, voters must show one of the
same qualified forms of ID expected by poll workers.138 The Crawford
Court relied on Indiana’s affidavit exception as a substantial
mitigating factor in its analysis.139 Second, Act 23 requires ID from
absentee voters.140 Only those in the military, living overseas, or who
have previously satisfied the ID requirement and maintain the same
home address are exempted from the ID requirement for absentee
ballots.141 Indiana’s law does not impose this requirement on absentee
voters, and the Crawford Court specifically cited this fact to minimize
the burden on elderly residents unable to locate the necessary
documents.142

134

Id. at 843.
Id. at 844.
136
Id.
137
See id.
138
Id.
139
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 199 (2008).
140
Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 844.
141
Id.
142
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 201.
135
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A. The Eastern District of Wisconsin finds Act 23
unconstitutional; the state appeals
In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin, plaintiffs brought an as-applied constitutional challenge to
Act 23 under the Fourteenth Amendment.143 Before his analysis of Act
23, District Judge Lynn Adelman addressed the precedential effect of
the Crawford decision. He first concluded that because six of the
Justices agreed that the Anderson/Burdick balancing test applied to
Indiana’s strict photo ID voter eligibility law, Act 23 should be
evaluated likewise.144 Judge Adelman then discussed the effect of the
split among Justices regarding whether such laws could be invalidated
on the basis of their effect on a subgroup of voters.145 He determined
that Crawford is not binding precedent on the issue.146 However, after
consideration of the Anderson and Burdick cases themselves, he
concluded that they “require invalidation of a law when the state
interests are insufficient to justify the burdens the law imposes on
subgroups of voters.”147
Judge Adelman began his analysis by addressing the state’s
four justifications for the law: 1) detecting and preventing in-person
voter-impersonation fraud; 2) promoting public confidence in the
143

Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 842. Plaintiffs also brought a statutory challenge
under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; however, any statutory analysis is beyond
the scope of this comment.
144
Id. at 845.
145
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200-03, 206. While the three Justice concurrence
opines that voter ID laws should be evaluated on the “basis of their ‘reasonably
foreseeable effect on voters generally,’” the three Justice Plurality opinion implies
that such laws could be invalidated solely by their effect on a subgroup of voters. Id.
146
Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 846 (The plurality opinion was narrowest because
it did not reach additional constitutional question of whether “a law could be
invalidated based on the burdens imposed on a subgroup of voters.”) (citing Marks
v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,
the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those members
who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.”)).
147
Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 846-47.

482
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss2/8

18

Pikor: Voter ID in Wisconsin: A Better Approach to Anderson/Burdick Bala

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 10, Issue 2

Spring 2015

integrity of the electoral process; 3) detecting and deterring other types
of voter fraud; and 4) promoting orderly election administration and
accurate recordkeeping.148
First, Judge Adelman accorded the state’s interest in voterfraud prevention very little weight despite acknowledging that voter
fraud prevention is a legitimate state interest.149 The evidence at trial
demonstrated that in-person voter impersonation fraud is virtually nonexistent in Wisconsin.150 Dispatching any contention that a lack of
voter-fraud evidence was attributable to underenforcement of existing
laws, Judge Adelman cited three fruitless sweeps in the state’s recent
history: the 2002 Department of Justice Ballot Access and Voting
Integrity Initiative, the 2004 Joint Task Force, and the 2008 Election
Fraud Task Force.151 He also dismissed the claim that the lack of
evidence was due to the difficulty of detecting such fraud.152 Although
the fraud itself may be difficult to detect, he suggested there would
surely be more circumstantial evidence of it.153 For example, voters
would find that a ballot had already been cast in their name.154 Lastly,
the evidence indicated that any development of future fraud issues was
exceedingly unlikely; therefore, “Act 23 cannot be deemed a
reasonable response to a potential problem.”155
Second, Judge Adelman concluded that “Act 23 does not
further the state interest of promoting public confidence in the
integrity of the electoral process.”156 The state presented no empirical
evidence supporting this claim; however, the plaintiffs presented
evidence in rebuttal.157 At trial, a professor of political science testified
148

Id. at 847.
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 848-49.
152
Id. at 849-50.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 849.
155
Id. at 850.
156
Id. at 852.
157
Id. at 851.
149
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that photo ID requirements have no actual effect on “a person’s level
of trust or confidence in the electoral process.”158 Another professor,
specializing in the study of the incidence of voter fraud in
contemporary American elections, testified that photo ID laws actually
undermine voter confidence.159 This is because the laws create a “false
perception that voter-impersonation fraud is widespread.”160
Furthermore, Judge Adelman argued that the laws work against public
confidence because much of the electorate believes that the ID
requirement disenfranchises and marginalizes many voters.161
Third, the Judge addressed the state’s claim that the ID
requirement will help detect and deter other forms of fraud, such as
voting by felons or non-citizens and double voting.162 Again, the state
presented no evidence in support of this claim.163 In fact, the state
neglected to adequately explain how the law might prevent these types
of fraud.164
Fourth, Judge Adelman found that any state interest Act 23
serves in promoting orderly election administration and accurate
recordkeeping is inseparable from the state’s interest in preventing
voter fraud.165 Because the defendants have failed to show how these
interests are distinct, the Judge found that “Act 23 serves the state’s
interest in orderly election administration and accurate recordkeeping
only to the extent that it serves the state’s interest in detecting and
preventing voter fraud.”166
Judge Adelman then examined the burdens Act 23 imposes on
voters.167 To begin, he acknowledged that the laws adverse effects
158

Id.
Id. at 848, 851.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 852.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 853.
166
Id.
167
Id.
159
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were felt primarily by those who did not currently possess qualifying
ID.168 Credible evidence at trial indicated that approximately 300,000
registered voters fit this description.169 Those individuals, who would
not otherwise require it, must take the necessary steps to obtain an ID
exclusively for the purpose of voting.170 Evidence also indicated that a
substantial portion of those voters without ID are low income
individuals.171 And because the Wisconsin law lacked any exceptions
similar to the indigence affidavit allowed by the Indiana law, all of
those voters must physically obtain proper ID to vote.172
To obtain proper ID, voters must first identify the requirements
for the ID and any required underlying documents such as a social
security card or birth certificate.173 The voter must then account for the
time and effort required to get the ID. Voters must travel to the DMV
at least once, and if necessary, to the other various government offices
for the other required documents.174
There are financial costs to consider as well. Low-income
individuals without a driver’s license often must pay to use public
transportation, which is not available everywhere in the state.175 Also,
although the state offers a free ID card, the underlying documents
often cost money.176 And due to the narrow business hours for state
agencies, these voters almost certainly require time off from work.177
Sometimes problems arise in the form of clerical errors where
the name on the birth certificate is not correct.178 To remedy these

168

Id.
Id. at 854.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
See id. at 863.
173
Id. at 857.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 857-58.
176
Id. at 858.
177
Id. at 857.
178
Id. at 859.
169
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problems, the amendment process requires that the voter must make
additional trips to various agencies.179
Judge Adelman then proceeded to weigh the burden on voters
against state interests.180 Because of these obstacles and the supporting
evidence at trial, he concluded that a “substantial number of the
300,000 plus voters who lack a qualifying ID will be deterred from
voting.”181 In fact, the record contains testimony from eight Wisconsin
residents who wished to vote in the upcoming election but could not
secure an acceptable ID.182 Therefore, “it is absolutely clear that Act
23 will prevent more legitimate votes from being cast than fraudulent
votes.”183 Accordingly, the state’s asserted interest in detecting and
preventing in-person voter fraud did not justify those burdens.184 As
for the other three justifications advanced by the state, as discussed
above, there was either no supporting evidence or counter-balancing
considerations.185 Thus, “the burdens imposed by Act 23 on those who
lack an ID are not justified.”186 Judge Adelman therefore held the law
violated Fourth Amendment protections and enjoined its
enforcement.187 The state immediately appealed and motioned for stay.
On September 12, 2014, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stayed
the district court’s injunction pending the outcome on appeal.188
B. The Seventh Circuit Reverses
Judge Easterbrook authored the unanimous opinion for the
three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which
179

Id. at 859-60.
Id. at 862.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 854-55.
183
Id. at 862.
184
Id. at 862.
185
Id. at 852-53.
186
Id. at 862-63.
187
Id.
188
Frank v. Walker, 769 F.3d 494 (7th. Cir. 2014).
180
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reviewed the case de novo, and reversed the lower court’s ruling.189
The panel held that Judge Adelman’s findings “did not justify an
outcome different from Crawford.”190 Although it agreed that
Wisconsin’s Act 23 differed from Indiana’s SEA 483, the panel found
any differences legally insignificant.191
First, the court dismissed any claim that Act 23 placed a higher
burden on voters than the Indiana law, and insisted voters face no
more difficulty in obtaining a qualifying ID in Wisconsin than they did
in Indiana.192 It argued that Wisconsin residents who fail to acquire the
requisite ID are not disenfranchised.193 Rather, they are merely
marginalized.194 The court did not find this troubling because “any
procedural step filters out some potential voters.”195 It stated that
because the DMW issues photo ID to anyone with a birth certificate,
all that can be inferred from a person without ID is that “he was
unwilling to invest the necessary time.”196 The court concluded that
foregoing a photo ID is a matter of choice for most eligible voters.197
In support, it cited a district court finding that more than half of the
eligible voters without ID possess a birth certificate.198 Because the
process of obtaining an ID is no more difficult in Wisconsin than
Indiana, the lower court’s ruling can only stand if the Act does not
serve any important purpose.199

189

Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 745 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
1551 (2015).
190
Id.
191
Id. at 746.
192
Id. at 749.
193
Id. at 748.
194
See id. at 748-49.
195
Id. at 749.
196
Id. at 748.
197
Id. at 749.
198
Id.
199
Id.
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The Seventh Circuit determined that the important purpose Act
23 served is also indistinguishable from the Indiana law.200 The court
dismissed the importance of the lower court’s determination that voter
fraud is non-existent because this was also the determination in
Crawford.201 The court required no evidence from the state for the
remaining three justifications: fraud deterrence, accurate
recordkeeping, and strengthening voter confidence.202 The Supreme
Court believed these were sound justifications for Indiana’s law;
therefore, they were equally sound justifications for Act 23.203
The panel specifically referred to the Crawford Court’s
determination that an ID requirement promotes public confidence in
the electoral system.204 It labeled this finding a “legislative fact”205 and
stated that the district court must accept such findings from the higher
court.206 It reasoned that ID laws “either promote confidence, or they
don’t; there is no way they could promote public confidence in Indiana
(as Crawford concluded) and not in Wisconsin.”207 Because the
Supreme Court already concluded that they promote confidence, a
district court judge cannot conclude otherwise, even when presented
with new and compelling evidence.208 And because these laws
promote confidence, there is sufficient state interest.209 Therefore,
unless plaintiffs can show they suffer significantly higher burdens
obtaining proper ID than voters in Indiana, the laws are valid in every
200

See id. at 749-50.
Id.
202
See id. at 750.
203
See id.
204
Id.
205
A legislative fact refers to a broad, general fact that is not unique and
relates indirectly to the parties to litigation. Judge Easterbrook defines a legislative
fact as “a proposition about the state of the world, as opposed to a proposition about
these litigants or about a single state.” Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
See id.
209
Id. at 751.
201
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state.210 On March 23, 2015, the Supreme Court announced its
decision to decline review of the case.
III. ANALYSIS
In the Frank opinion, Judge Easterbrook highlighted a very
important distinction: the difference between disenfranchisement and
marginalization.211 Indeed, the proper analysis of a particular law
depends on it. Dunn212 and its progeny are still precedential, so where
a plaintiff can show that voters have been categorically prevented from
accessing the polls, strict scrutiny should be applied. Heightened
scrutiny is also appropriate where a law makes it significantly more
difficult to vote, thereby suppressing voters.213 But the level of
suppression courts should tolerate remains unclear.
A. A strategic balance
As discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court has been
ambiguous about precisely when an election law imposes a severe
burden on voters. In Crawford, the Court found the record insufficient
to support a claim that Indiana’s voter ID law crossed that line.214
However, the record was more developed in Frank.215 There, credible
evidence suggested that compared to Indiana, six times as many
registered voters in Wisconsin would be affected.216 Also,
210

Id. at 750.
Id. at 748.
212
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
213
E.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
214
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202 (2008).
215
See Frank, 773 F.3d 783; Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854-55
(E.D. Wis. 2014), rev'd, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551
(2015).
216
District Judge Barker “estimated that as of 2005, when the statute was
enacted, around 43,000 Indiana residents lacked a state-issued driver’s license or
identification card.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 188-89. District Judge Adelman found
211
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considerations such as financial costs, inconvenience, travel issues,
and time off work were more substantiated through statistical and
testimonial evidence.217 Despite this, the district court in Frank
seemed to concede, without deliberation, that Wisconsin’s law does
not impose severe restrictions.218 It proceeded directly to balancing the
law’s burden on voters against the state’s asserted justifications.219 The
conservative panel in the court of appeals certainly did not raise the
issue in the district court’s stead.
Perhaps Judge Adelman made a strategic choice in his district
court opinion. The U.S. Supreme Court rarely characterizes a law’s
effects as severe. Decided in 2000, California Democratic Party was
the most recent case where the Court applied strict scrutiny because an
election regulation severely burdened voters. 220 This could reasonably
imply that this standard is quite high. Additionally, the Court has not
suggested any bright line rules or factors for consideration. Instead, it
has simply invited the lower courts to make a “hard judgment.”221
But in making such a subjective judgment, a lower court leaves
itself especially vulnerable to an adverse ruling on appeal. Despite
careful use of empirical evidence to show a substantial burden on
voters, any characterization of that burden as severe is entirely judicial
discretion. Conversely, a lower court would likely be less susceptible
to reversal where it carefully evaluated the evidence demonstrating
both a law’s burden on voters and the supporting justifications
advanced by the state. Although there would still be some subjectivity
to the balance of interests, a higher court would certainly have to work
harder to undo such analysis by a lower court.
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit panel did overturn Judge
Adelson’s ruling, but not without exposing its subjectivity. The court
“that approximately 300,000 registered voters in Wisconsin, roughly 9% of all
registered voters, lack a qualifying ID.” Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 854.
217
See Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 854-55.
218
Id. at 846-47.
219
Id. at 847.
220
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 582 (2000).
221
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190.
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embraced certain pieces of evidence, ignored others, and supported
several of its conclusions with false statements and erroneous
assumptions.222 More importantly, even if the Seventh Circuit arrived
at the proper legal result, it is unlikely it secured an efficient outcome.
Credible evidence indicated that 300,000 people would have to
take affirmative action to maintain their right to vote.223 Many of them
must spend substantial time, money, and effort to do so.224
Furthermore, the district court found the evidence conclusive that the
law would prevent more legitimate votes from being cast than
fraudulent votes.225 The counterbalancing benefits for the law were
comparatively weak. The problem lawmakers designed the law to fix
does not exist in Wisconsin.226 The Seventh Circuit panel grounded its
justification primarily on the Supreme Court’s speculative assumption
that voter ID laws improved voter confidence,227 despite credible
recent evidence to the contrary.228 Judges can only reasonably uphold
222

See generally Frank 773 F.3d at 783 (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (describing the Seventh Circuit Panel’s erroneous justifications
for its ruling. For example, the panel opinion states that Act 23 would prevent voting
by underage children and non-citizens; however non-citizens can easily obtain a
Wisconsin state-issued ID and acceptable student IDs need not include a date of
birth. Other examples include the panel opinion’s erroneous assumption that photo
ID cannot be a burdensome requirement because one needs it to fly, pick up
prescriptions at pharmacies, open a bank account. However, in Wisconsin, one does
not need an ID for all prescriptions; bank customers do not need photo ID to open an
account; Federal law does not require photo ID to purchase firearms at gun shows,
flea markets or online; and the Supreme Court requires no ID of visitors.).
223
Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 854.
224
Id. at 855-57.
225
Id. at 862.
226
Id. at 847-48.
227
Frank, 768 F. 3d at 750-51 (arguing that because the Supreme Court
previously concluded voter ID laws promote confidence, a district judge cannot
subsequently dispute this finding, even when presented with recent evidence which
contradicts that conclusion).
228
Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 851. See Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel
Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in the
Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1756
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a law with such doubtful net advantages so long as the legal test
maintains its deference to the state.
B. Addressing the proper concern
The Anderson/Burdick balance grants this deference to state
regulations that impose less than a severe burden on voters.229 The
Supreme Court describes such non-severe regulations as evenhanded,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory,230 essentially referring to facially
neutral laws. However, there is compelling evidence that laws like Act
23, though facially neutral, disproportionately affect African
Americans, Latinos, women, and the indigent.231 Although several of
these subgroups are constitutionally protected classes for purposes of
equal protection, a discriminatory impact upon them is not sufficient
to violate those protections.232 A plaintiff must demonstrate
discriminatory intent, which can be difficult to confirm.233 Perhaps this
contributed to the Supreme Court’s decision to adopt a balancing test
for election regulations. Regardless, few would seriously argue that
voter ID laws are primarily motivated by racial prejudice, outright
sexism, or animosity toward the poor. However, there is reason to
suspect that voter ID laws, like most of history’s controversial election
regulations, originate with political self-interest.
As mentioned above, the United States has an extensive history
of voter suppression with facially neutral laws. For example,
(2008) (concluding no relationship between voter ID laws and a person’s level of
trust or confidence in the electoral system).
229
E.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992); Timmons v. Twin
Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997); Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S.
581, 592 (2005).
230
E.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189-90 (2008).
231
See generally Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 870-79 (discussing the evidence
presented at trial that Act 23 disproportionately affects Black, Latino and indigent
voters); Michael J. Pitts, Empirically Measuring the Impact of Photo ID Over Time
and its Impact on Women, 48 Ind. L. Rev. 605 (2015).
232
See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
233
See, e.g., id.
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Massachusetts and Connecticut adopted literacy tests in the 1850s.234
These requirements suppressed and disenfranchised the poor and
uneducated, and thus disproportionately affected African-American
and Native American subgroups.235 Congress waited until 1975 before
passing a permanent nationwide ban on literacy tests.236 More recent
examples of facially neutral laws that disproportionately impact
minority groups include felon disenfranchisement, the elimination of
early voting opportunities, and voter ID laws.
The most troubling contemporary concerns regarding election
regulations are political. The obvious fear is that lawmakers might
manipulate election laws to entrench themselves in office. Less
conspicuous, but equally troubling, is the possibility that confirmation
bias237 blinds lawmakers, leading to the irrational justification of a
laws virtue.238 And to be clear, these concerns lie on both sides of the
aisle. For example, literacy tests and other suppressive election
regulations made Republicans unelectable in the southern state general
elections for a substantial period.239 Early voting restrictions often
disproportionately affect black voters, which adversely affects
democratic turnout.240 Both Republican and Democratic controlled

234

KEYSSAR, supra note 27 at 142.
Id. at 112, 255.
236
Id. at 274.
237
See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous
Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2(2) Rev. of Gen. Psy. 175 (1998). (“Confirmation
bias, as the term is typically used in the psychological literature, connotes the
seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs,
expectations, or a hypothesis in hand.”)
238
Id. at 191-92 (discussing cognitive bias as applied to policy rationalization).
239
See KEYSSAR, supra note 27 at 107-08.
240
Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 440 (6th Cir. 2012).
235
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Legislatures have gerrymandered241 district boundaries to all but
guarantee their party victory in certain district-wide elections.242
Nevertheless, voter ID laws benefit republicans politically.
And critics of these laws argue they are designed to do just that. For
example, in his dissent from the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in
Crawford, Judge Evans characterized Indiana’s voter ID law as “a nottoo-thinly-veiled attempt to discourage election-day turnout by certain
folks believed to skew Democratic.”243
When passing Act 23, Wisconsin legislators predictably split
along party lines. Republican legislators voted unanimously for the
law, democrats united against it.244 The liberal district court judge
ruled against it;245 the conservative three-judge panel in the Seventh
Circuit ruled in favor of the law.246 Conservative and liberal media
outlets predictably tow their respective party’s line.247 Of course, the
fact that support for this particular policy almost universally depends
on party alignment does not necessarily mean that support is guided by
politics rather than a genuine interest in election integrity. However, it
does raise justifiable suspicion. But because proponents of such laws
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have been able to advance some justification for them, even if
hypothetical or speculative, the laws stand. Again, this is possible
because the Anderson/Burdick balance grants deference to states’
interests. To remedy this, courts should carve an exception where
misconduct appears likely.
C. A better approach to Anderson/Burdick balancing
An effective constitutional analysis of election laws needs to
acknowledge the possibility of improper partisanship by lawmakers.
Accordingly, where a plaintiff can demonstrate a strong likelihood that
the primary motive for a law’s passage is political, courts should not
accord the state deference.248 Courts should consider factors such as
whether a law: (1) confers a political advantage to the enacting
lawmakers or their party; (2) politically disadvantages their opponents
or an opposing party; (3) dilutes or otherwise weakens the political
participation of identifiable groups of voters; and (4) creates sharp
division along party lines. Where this improper partisanship appears
likely, a court’s presumption should shift in favor of the plaintiff; and
the burden of showing that the law’s benefits outweigh its burden on
voters should fall upon the state.
This burden-shifting approach would be effective for several
reasons. First, it would help ensure the utility of election regulations
and discourage lawmakers from passing unnecessary, bureaucratic
laws. Although regulations which offset the benefits they provide by
imposing equally burdensome restrictions are generally undesirable,
courts appropriately give state lawmakers wide latitude to regulate
their own elections.249 However, ethically questionable election
regulations that fail to provide clear, demonstrable, and convincing
benefits should not stand. The elimination of such zero-sum
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regulations would help ensure lawmakers keep focus on public policy
rather than political maneuvering.
Second, this approach would increase voter confidence. As the
Supreme Court noted in Crawford, “public confidence in the integrity
of the electoral process has independent significance, because it
encourages citizen participation in the democratic process.” 250 As
discussed above, the United States has a troubling history involving
election law; yet, the current election law analysis ignores politically
self-serving tactics. This initial inquiry into improper politics would
bolster a public perception of trust in our electoral system by
acknowledging the concern and demanding adequate justification
when it arises.
Third, the partisanship inquiry would force judges to confront
their own political bias.251 Part of the current concern is partisan
judicial activism. If the constitutional analysis of election regulations
included an explicit inquiry into improper partisanship, judges would
be less likely to put a finger on the scale in their party’s favor,
consciously or subconsciously. This approach would create more
pressure on judges to sufficiently justify any ruling that furthered their
own person political interests to both the public and their peers in the
judiciary.
Professor Dan Tokaji suggested inappropriate partisan
manipulation of state voting processes should trigger heightened
scrutiny.252 Going even further, Professor Edward B. Foley
recommended courts replace the Anderson/Burdick balance entirely
with an inquiry into whether an election regulation was indeed “a ploy
to achieve a partisan advantage.”253 However, both of these
approaches fail to allow sufficient room for laws that may appear
improper but were passed in good faith and provide adequate utility.
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Also, they run contradictory to the Supreme Court’s history of
allowing states wide latitude in governing their election procedures. In
Crawford, the Supreme Court stated that “if a nondiscriminatory law
is supported by valid neutral justifications, those justifications should
not be disregarded simply because partisan interests may have
provided one motivation for the votes of individual legislators.”254
Although entrenchment tactics should be treated harshly in the context
of election law, concrete evidence of actual intent will seldom be
available. Rather, courts should consider whether wrongful political
tactics are likely. Then, by reversing the presumption to favor plaintiffs
and placing the onus on the state to demonstrate a law’s usefulness,
courts can adequately address this concern while not overly intruding
into state sovereignty.
If the Seventh Circuit employed this balance-shifting approach
in Frank, the outcome would certainly be reversed. To begin, all the
factors supporting a claim of improper partisanship are present;
support and opposition for Act 23 split along partisan lines255 and
credible evidence indicated the law disproportionately weakened
participation by certain subgroups that tend to support democratic
candidates.256 Thus, the law disadvantaged the Democratic Party, and
accordingly, conferred a political benefit on its primary rival, the
Republican Party. Therefore, the Court should disallow the
presumption favoring the state replace it with the burden of proof.
Next, as discussed in detail above, defendants in Frank were unable to
establish Act 23’s benefits to the extent necessary to outweigh its
burden on voters. Under these facts, the plaintiff’s challenge is
successful.
However, if defendants were able to show that voter fraud was
present in Wisconsin and that Act 23 competently addressed this
problem, their burden would be carried. In this scenario, a decision
favoring defendants is a desirable outcome. Here, the state is
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hypothetically able to demonstrate that our democratic system of
governance was actively perverted through fraud and the law solved or
substantially mitigated that problem. Those benefits are substantial
enough to defeat plaintiffs challenge in this case, even though
partisanship may have influenced the decisions of individual
lawmakers.
For this hypothetical, if the panel inquired only whether
improper partisanship was present, like Professor Foley suggested,
plaintiffs challenge would succeed. This outcome is problematic
because the fraud would continue. Furthermore, where the only
solutions available are more easily tolerated by affluent members of
the electorate, a fix would remain elusive as long as the legislature is
controlled by republicans. If the court applied heightened scrutiny
here, as Professor Tokaji suggested, the outcome is less certain.
Plaintiffs might be able to present a narrower alternative, or the court
may insist that the state further tailor the current law. Regardless, this
presents a similar problem. While republicans control Wisconsin’s
legislature, courts would be forced to closely scrutinize all laws more
easily tolerated by conservative-leaning groups. Where these laws are
otherwise beneficial, courts should not require they meet such lofty
standards.
CONCLUSION
The current federal constitutional analysis of individual
election regulations allows both lawmakers and judges much
discretion in their respective drafting and evaluation of these laws.
This is a necessary element for a jurisprudential standard charged with
overseeing a body of law whose regulations inherently interfere with
fundamental constitutional rights to some degree. However, while the
Anderson/Burdick test has provided a more clear and consistent
mechanism for courts to use when analyzing ballot access restrictions,
a fundamental piece is still missing. An approach that more
competently addresses the political nature of election law would both
decrease improper partisan activity and increase public confidence and
trust in the system. In Frank, the Seventh Circuit demonstrated the
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malleability of the Anderson/Burdick balance. Neither the District
Court nor the Appellate Court clearly erred in their applications of the
test. But, because the most historically troubling motive in election
law appeared a likely factor there, both judicial and legislative
discretion should be narrowed.
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